Dumping - One of Those Economic Myths by Kerr, William A.
211
The Estey Centre Journal of
I n t e rn ational  L aw
and Trade Po l i cy
E d i t o rial Office: 410 22nd St. E . , Suite 820, S a s k a t o o n , S K , C a n a d a , S7K 5T6.
Phone (306) 244-4800; Fax (306) 244-7839; e m a i l : Ke rr. w @ s k . s y m p a t i c o. c a
Dumping—One of Those Economic Myths1
William A. Kerr
Van Vliet Professor,University of Saskatchewan, and Senior Associate, The Estey Centre for
Law and Economics in International Trade
Dumping is one of the most poorly understood and contentious issues in trade policy. The
primary reason is that the agreed definitions of dumping are not based on a solid economic
foundation. This allows antidumping measures to be used for protectionist ends and to
harass trade partners. While putting antidumping measures on a sounder economic founda-
tion in international law may be difficult given their popularity with politicians, no progress
can be made until economists provide a theoretically sustainable definition of dumping and
devise a set of transparent criteria for determining if dumping is occurring. This paper
explains the difficulties with the current definitions of dumping and outlines an agenda for
future progress.
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Senator Max Baucus, the highest ranking Democrat on the Senate Finance
Committee, has sent a letter signed by 61 of the 100 U.S. senators to President
Bush insisting that they would oppose any international trade agreement that
weakened U.S. antidumping and other trade laws (May 7, 2001).2
On Myths
I
n popular culture there are what are known as “urban myths”. These are stories that are
widely circulated and believed that, when subjected to close scrutiny and investigative
research, are found to have no basis in fact. Another characteristic they share is that they
tend to be persistent—parents are often mystified when their children relate as gospel an
Vol um e   2   Num ber   2 , 2 00 1/  p. 2 1 1 - 2 2 0 e s t ey j o u r n a l . c o mupdated version of some long-forgotten story that was circulating when they were young.
Frequently, the myth includes a mysterious bogeyman that adds to the tale’s enduring
appeal. Urban myths often transcend national and cultural boundaries. For the most part,
urban myths are harmless diversions that entertain and, in their telling, provide a vehicle
that facilitates social interaction.
In international trade law, however, there is a similar phenomenon of mythical propor-
tions—dumping. Unlike its relatively benign “urban” counterpart, this “economic” myth
imposes substantial costs on firms that engage in international commercial transactions, on
taxpayers, and on consumers in importing countries. It wastes resources by encouraging
rent seeking and requiring the preparation of complex legal arguments by both those bring-
ing a case and the accused who must defend themselves. It allows governments to harass
foreign firms. It reduces the credibility of the international trade law system and its institu-
tions. Cynicism about antidumping actions is widespread among international trade pro-
fessionals, but their criticism seldom extends beyond the difficulties associated with imple-
mentation and procedures—in short, criticisms seldom extend to debunking the myth itself.
Here the blame rests squarely on the shoulders of economists, because dumping is an eco-
nomic matter and one cannot expect trade lawyers, trade law administrators, or politicians
to take an active part in exposing the myth. Economists need to return to the basics and pro-
vide an intellectually sound analysis of the dumping question. Without such basic ground-
work, no progress can be expected in this most contentious area of international trade law.
This paper attempts to outline the nature of the problem and to point the way toward a
research agenda for economists.
Some cynics may argue that this would be wasted effort because antidumping is too
convenient a mechanism for politicians seeking to deflect protectionist pressures for it ever
to be given up. While antidumping actions certainly provide an escape valve in the domes-
tic politics of protection in some countries, once can hardly expect legislators to propose
changes to bad laws without a sound basis for doing so. As long as the myth remains com-
mon currency, no progress can be expected.
Why is Dumping a Myth?
P
art of the economist’s problem with analysing dumping is that it is already defined in
international trade law.As a result, much of the current work on dumping takes the def-
inition(s) as given and then seeks to analyse the effects of applying those definitions to a
set of circumstances or a particular antidumping action. The heart of the dumping myth,
however, lies with the logic that underlies the accepted definitions of dumping in interna-
tional trade law. For members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), antidumping
actions are undertaken through domestic institutions but these national determinations are
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varies in detail but, for WTO members, conforms to the WTO’s Antidumping Agreement.3
Dumping refers to the pricing practices of firms engaging in international commerce
and should not be confused with firms selling into an importer’s market after receiving
“unfair” subsidies. The latter are cases where countervailing duties can be applied. This
point is made because the two are often used interchangeably in the press and common dis-
course. The definitions of dumping used in the Antidumping Agreement are as follows:
Article 2.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a product is to be considered as
being dumped, i.e. introduced into the commerce of another country at less than
its normal value, if the export price of the product exported from one country to
another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for like
product when destined for consumption in the exporting country.
Article 2.2 When there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of
trade in the domestic market of the exporting country or when, because of the
particular market situation or the low volume of sales in the domestic market of
the exporting country, such sales do not permit a proper comparison, the margin
of dumping shall be determined by comparison with a comparable price of like
product when exported to an appropriate third country, provided that this price
is representative, or with the cost of production in the country of origin plus a
reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits.
It is important to note that these definitions are to be applied separately, not concurrently.
The first definition, Article 2.1, can be termed the “price-discrimination” definition.
Stripped of its legal language, it says that a country may impose antidumping duties if a for-
eign firm sells its product in the importer’s market at a price lower than in its home market.
This is the WTO’s preferred definition of dumping. The central question to ask is why price
discrimination should be considered an “unfair” trade practice—the proverbial foreign
bogeyman choosing to sell at a lower price in a foreign market than he does at home. It is
easy for economists to show that price discrimination is simply a normal business practice
—profit-maximizing activity—when a firm faces different demand curves in markets that
can be separated (see the discussion of a price-discriminating monopolist in any intermedi-
ate microeconomics text, e.g., Mansfield, 1979, pp. 298-300). Price discrimination is gen-
erally recognised as normal business practice in domestic competition policy and is not ille-
gal. Anyone who has ever purchased a discount airline ticket, availed themselves of a
seniors’price, or used coupons in a supermarket is engaging in a transaction undertaken by
a firm practising price discrimination. While customers paying the full price on airlines,
etc., may sometimes complain, the complaint is not that the discount price should be done
away with, but that they should be allowed to avail themselves of it. Of course, this is the
opposite of a dumping complaint. As firms engaging in price discrimination do so volun-
tarily, it seems unlikely that they would lobby for it to be declared “unfair”. The question
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be considered “unfair” when practiced internationally? One of the definitions of dumping
presented in Article 2.2 may provide clues to the answer.
Before examining the second definition, it is instructive to delve into the origins of
antidumping legislation. Canada has the unenviable distinction of having enacted the first
antidumping legislation in 1904.4 In reading the debates surrounding the introduction of
special duties on undervalued products5 it is clear that the intent of the “dumping” clause
was to prevent exporters from reducing the value reported on their invoices to avoid pay-
ing the full value of customs duties, and not to offset price discrimination. The Minister of
Customs, The Hon. William Patterson is clear on this point:
If a man in another country wishes to sell his goods at 25 percent under the
domestic price, that is a perfectly legitimate transaction as between the seller
and the buyer (Debates of the House of Commons, Dominion of Canada, May
14, 1903, p. 3050).
He goes on to say:
But the law makes it imperative on the Customs Department to see that the duty
is paid on the value of that article in the country of production … (p. 3050).
The legislation, however, introduces the term “fair market value” to mean the price at
which the imported good is sold in the exporter’s domestic market, but only for the purpose
of establishing the duty to be paid.6 Implicitly, however, this wording suggested that a price
less than this would be “unfair” and might be the source of later confusion regarding dump-
ing.
Article 2.2 of the Antidumping Agreement provides two additional definitions, or tests,
to be used in situations where the price-discrimination definition cannot be applied. The
first is commonly referred to as the “third market test” and suggests that when no domes-
tic market for a product exists, dumping can be deemed to be taking place when an export-
ing firm is selling at a lower price in one export market than in another export market—the
firm is practising price discrimination. Again, this pricing practice can be easily explained
as a normal business practice if the demand curves in the two markets are different. Further,
as suggested above, price discrimination is not considered an “unfair” business practice in
domestic markets.
The second definition in Article 2.2 suggests that dumping is taking place when the
price the firm charges in the importing country is less than the firm’s costs, where cost is
taken to include a normal rate of return—something very similar to what economists would
call the total cost of production. In Article 2.2.1 the definition is further clarified as mean-
ing “prices below per unit (fixed and variable) costs of production plus administrative,
selling and general costs”. In short, dumping is selling below cost. Again, this makes for
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markets at prices we can’t compete with.
If the selling-below-cost criterion were applied domestically, however, one suspects it
would be a rare firm that could consistently avoid being in violation of the law. Firms do
not always sell at a break-even price or above. Firms lose money at times. Markets cycle,
recessions occur, businesses misjudge markets and have sales to dispose of inventory. The
question then arises, why should foreign firms be held to a higher standard than domestic
firms? Of course, this definition means that in times of low prices firms in both countries
may be losing money, but a foreign exporter can be charged with dumping for following
exactly the same pricing strategy as domestic firms.
Thus, as currently defined, dumping does not appear to be an “unfair” business prac-
tice. It is an economic myth that can, however, be exploited by those seeking protection. Of
course, they have the force of international trade law behind them.
International Predation 
W
hile it is relatively easy to dismiss the current definitions of dumping as business
practices that should not be of concern for public policy makers, a nagging feeling
of unease probably remains. Selling below cost and charging a lower price in one market
than in others might, at an intuitive level, seem to characterize predatory pricing—selling
below cost to drive competitors out of a market so that a monopoly is attained, and along
with it future monopoly profits. In the short run the losses in the market preyed upon can
be covered from other markets where the firm enjoys a degree of market power and super-
normal profits. Predatory pricing is considered an “unfair” business practice in many juris-
dictions and domestic competition policy is used to deal with it. It could certainly be argued
that it might not be possible to apply domestic competition law to firms operating in a for-
eign country but exporting their product at a predatory price. As a result, an international
trade remedy might be an alternative policy option that could be considered.7
The WTO’s Antidumping Agreement appears to go some way toward recognizing that
to be a public policy problem, selling below cost must be more than simply a short-run
“sale” to reduce inventory.8 With regard to observed prices below cost, Article 2.2.1 states
that they may be ignored in the determination of normal value
…if the authorities determine that such sales are made within an extended peri-
od of time in substantial quantities and at prices which do not provide for the
recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of time.
Whether this can be taken to be a recognition of price predation is not clear. In any case, the
“selling-below-cost” definition is not to be used together with the “price-discrimination”
definition in dumping determinations.
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tion together may be a necessary condition for predatory pricing to occur, it is not a suffi-
cient condition. It is a necessary condition because, while pricing in the importer’s market
at a lower price than in the firm’s home (or third) market may cause losses for domestic
firms in the importer’s market, if the foreign firm is not selling below cost it is simply more
efficient. Selling at a lower price because one is more efficient is not a public policy prob-
lem—it is the essence of competition.
A pricing strategy that combines selling below cost and price discrimination, however,
does not necessarily indicate predatory behaviour. Firms can lose money in the short run.
A price-discriminating monopolist could easily be losing money in both markets.9 Of
course, if those market conditions persist, then the firm will have to exit both markets.
While it is waiting for markets to recover, however, it is not preying upon competitors in
the lower-priced market—it is simply pricing to minimise its losses.
In a similar fashion, a firm with the ability to price discriminate may be covering its
costs in the high-priced market but not covering its costs in the low-priced market.10 One
concrete illustration is the pricing strategy followed by domestic airlines where the prices
charged to business customers who must travel on short notice more than cover the aver-
age cost of a flight spread over a plane relatively full of business customers. The discount
prices for a few last-minute standby passengers do not cover the average cost of a flight,
but it is still in the airline’s interest to fill the seats with customers, even at a lower fare.
This is not predatory pricing even if both price discrimination and selling below cost in the
low-priced market are being practised simultaneously.
While it is clear that disciplining a firm’s pricing strategy (as opposed to tariff avoid-
ance) was not the objective of Canada’s original antidumping law, by the 1920s the clear
intent of antidumping was the disciplining of “unfair” business practices perpetrated inter-
nationally. The seminal economic work on dumping is Jacob Viner’s 1923 Dumping: A
Problem in International Trade.11 Viner states:
But sufficient justification is to be found … for confining the term dumping to
price-discrimination between national markets (original emphasis)(p. 3).
Viner is extensively quoted to this day by those who study dumping. Awide variety of inter-
national trade texts simply develop a short-run price discrimination model in an interna-
tional context in their sections on dumping. Of course, this reflects the current definition in
international trade law. It is a circular problem.
Predatory pricing means that a firm has chosen a pricing strategy that does not maxi-
mize profits in the short run. Instead, it is willing to give up profits in the near term on the
expectation that it will reap the benefits of monopoly profits in the long run. If nothing else,
this means analysing a firm’s pricing strategy using the traditional short-run models of
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ing the economic aspects of the dumping myth. The challenge for the economics profes-
sion is to formally model predatory pricing and then to devise simple but unambiguous
tests that can be used for establishing international norms. One suspects that the challenge
may not prove an easy one but until the task is accomplished little of positive value can be
added to the debate on dumping.
Economists have not given a great deal of attention to predatory pricing. The reason is
that it is not a common practice of firms. This is because it is not an efficient method for
monopolizing a market. A firm practising predatory pricing in a market must endure a long
period of losses in forcing competitors out of business, suffer those losses over a large pro-
portion of the market’s sales, and may not be able to prevent the re-entry of competitors
when it attempts to raise the price in subsequent periods. McGee (1958) makes a very
strong case that, if a firm’s objective is to monopolize a market, it is much less costly to do
so through a strategy of mergers and acquisitions than it is through predatory pricing. This
is reflected in the weighting given to the two topics in domestic competition legislation.
One suspects that if predatory pricing became the only criterion for dumping, it would be
such a rare occurrence that it would cease to be a concern. There is, however, a situation
where international predatory pricing might become a concern. This would be when a
country has policies to limit the take-over of domestic firms by foreign companies. With
the merger or acquisition avenue closed off, foreign firms that see an opportunity to
monopolize a market may well choose an alternative strategy such as predatory pricing.
Whether this happens or not is an empirical question. In any case, the major users of
antidumping actions currently are economies that are relatively open to foreign direct
investment.
C o n c l u s i o n
W
ithout the development of a better theoretical underpinning for dumping, it will be
difficult to justify reform—and to debunk the myth. Part of the problem is that the
current WTO Antidumping Agreement has no clearly stated objective. According to
Koulen (1995), in the agreement there are no
…preambular considerations on questions of fundamental objectives and prin-
ciples of antidumping action (p. 232).
One is struck by the absence of any rationale for the agreement, and it moves immediate-
ly to the definitions. With a strong theoretical justification for predatory pricing being the
problem that antidumping should address, it might be possible to have it included as the
agreement’s rationale. It is often argued that instead of worrying about reforming
antidumping, the way forward is the international application of competition policy. While
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national systems of competition policy, along with its wide ranging scope, will probably
preclude an agreement on its use to police international commerce. Predatory pricing is a
much narrower issue.
If prevention of predatory pricing were to be adopted as the international rationale for
antidumping actions, one suspects that it would be too narrow for protectionists, who find
solace and relief in the current application of antidumping actions. As presently constitut-
ed, antidumping measures can be used to attempt to reduce imports every time interna-
tional markets decline. The poor economic rationale also allows protectionist interests to
threaten foreign competitors and to use existing domestic mechanisms for harassment
through the costs required to prepare defences. The WTO already has mechanisms to deal
with surges of imports, the safeguard clauses. These clauses offer a strictly protectionist
measure that is mutually agreed by the members of the WTO. Safeguards have been agreed
to because countries understand that rapid changes in international market conditions can
impose unacceptable economic (and political) costs on society. Unlike dumping, there is
no “economic” rationale that is used to justify the invocation of safeguards. Safeguards
provide protection. Safeguards could be renegotiated to provide greater assistance to
domestic protectionists if dumping were to be given a better theoretical rationale.
Unlike safeguards, antidumping actions rest on flawed economic arguments that are
trotted out to justify protection. This clearly confuses the issue and sometimes acts in the
interests of protectionists. While it is clear that some politicians will fiercely resist changes
to the current antidumping mechanism, it is also clear that before any progress can be
expected a better economic rationale is required. Without efforts in this direction by the
economics profession, one suspects that dumping myths and their assorted international
bogeymen will be related by future generations in the same way as recurring urban myths. 
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